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This paper examines Africa’s recalcitrant development dilemma- its origins and 
the complete oscillation of stratagems that have been evolved to resolve it. The 
paper addresses the underlying intellectual arguments that directly informed 
policy prescriptions from the Import Substitution Industrialization strategies of 
the Sixties to the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) and the prevailing 
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) initiative. The paper then 
discusses the confluence of the two traditions in what is known in development 
parlance as development partnerships, arguing that this is in part a reflection 
and offshoot of extant global balance of power.
Origins of the Crisis
A motley of reasons and origins have been adduced for the crisis of develop-
ment in Africa, varying from socio-political to techno-economic factors. To be 
sure, Africa’s economic and subsequently socio-political decline was sparked 
by the agrarian crisis of the late Seventies. The first post-independence decade 
was generally speaking a prosperous one for Africa but the crisis in agricultural 
production that resulted in rising food import bills, acute food shortages and 
increasing dependence on food aid precipitated the decline of the continent. 
The oil shocks of 1973-1974 and 1979-1980 and the resultant global economic 
depression then exacerbated the situation. What eventually brought Africa to the 
nadir of economic misery and hopelessness was the debt problem that ensued 
from initial borrowings of recycled petrodollars to finance African budgets, espe-
cially unrevised import bills. Onimode classifies Africa’s development experience 
into two broad periods, the pre-crisis period of up to the mid Seventies and the 
crisis period of the late Nineties and the adjustment years of 1980 and beyond 
(Onimode, 1993).
But why exactly did the African crisis ensue and why did it deepen instead 
of stopping? Some have cited the nature and character of the post-independent 
African elite and urban class as a major cause. This class was not only praetorian1 
but it was also predatory, lacked vision and was totally ideologically bankrupt. Its 
disjuncture and aloofness from the rest of the populace set Africa on the path 
of self-destruction from very early on (Fanon 1967, Onimode 1988, Ake 1987, 
1996, Dudley 1973, 1982, Abubakar 1989, Arrighi and Saul 1968).
Whereas Onimode identified the ‘ideological vacuum’ of the emergent 
post-colonial hegemonic class, arising from what he called ‘fears of revolution-
ary pressures’, Abubakar (1989) alludes to ‘…the wrong way the African power 
1 A term first invented by Billy Dudley. (1982).
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elite perceived independence and the resulting way in which they managed their 
economies and society’. Ake’s vituperations and indictment of the political elite 
is however by far bolder and more acidic:
The ideology of development was exploited as a means of reproduc-
ing political hegemony; it got limited attention and served hardly any 
purpose as a framework for economic transformation (Ake 1996).
As far as Ake was concerned, the immediate post-independence political class 
all over Africa paid only lip service to the cause of socio-economic emancipation 
of the continent, for them, development was only a favourite charade.
However, the sociological-ideological roots of the African crisis are not often 
considered as salient as the economic dimensions. As the apparent elite-mass 
disconnection of most post-colonial African societies was damaging and in spite 
of the overbearing and repressive nature of political power, which engendered 
what Onimode refers to as a culture of ‘silence and passivity’, precluding the 
public debate of national issues; it is the strictly economic matter that dominates 
the discourse of the origins of the African crisis.
The substantive causes of the African crisis are best addressed by an 
eclectic approach; methodologies which simply trace an allegory of the very 
polemical debate and attempt impassioned pontification, not only concludes with 
a jaundiced narrative but oftentimes fail to synthesise the arguments of the con-
tending traditions. Furthermore, according to Sutcliffe, a non-multidisciplinary, 
non cross-cultural approach risks missing out ‘important aspects of their origins 
and also fail to understand their specific nature’ (Sutcliffe 1986 p20).
What follows presently is an analysis of the intellectual debate as to the 
origins/ causes of Africa’s development dilemma and the contrasting policy pre-
scription arising from the different traditions and articulation of the valid aspects 
of the contending arguments.
Two Traditions and Trends in Africa’s Developmental Process.
The precise period of Africa’s most recent impasse would seem to be the late 
70s – early 80s as a series of negative developments seemed to coalesce in this 
period- reverse democratic waves, retard growth, decline commodity prices/
trade and national incomes etc., it can therefore be safely assumed Africa never 
recovered from the first oil shock of 1974/75. Moreover, the healthy growth rates 
recorded by African economies suddenly vanished and the golden decade of 
commodity export evaporated with the emergence of black gold. At about this 
time also, emigration from the continent in search of greener pastures became 
increasingly attractive.
Several explanations have been supported for Africa’s socio-economic 
quagmire but these can be broadly grouped into two traditions, exogenous-
liberal and endogenous-riposte theories. The former tradition is composed 
of western analytic and prescriptive discourse of the African crisis and apart 
from being churned out by scholars and observers mainly from the North, it is 
marked by its ahistoricity, static methodology, eurocentrism and it is invariably 
teleological. (Barongo: 1983, Toyo: 1983). Barongo especially affirms that these 
theories refuse to press their enquiries beyond the confines of Africa and were 
therefore static.
This school according to Mkandawire is:
…characterized by the casualness with which assertions… are made, 
and the deterministic and aprioristic nature of the discourse rarely 
based on analysis of the actual experiences, but merely on first 
principles, ideological conviction or faith (Mkandawire 1998: 2)
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Another very important feature of exogenous narratives of the African crisis is the 
penchant for its diagnosis to hold Africa totally or at least primarily responsible 
for the predicament of underdevelopment, i.e. these accounts tend to exonerate 
non-African actors, especially the mechanism of international economic rela-
tions as partially culpable for the African crisis. The vintage relic of this school 
is probably the World Bank 1981 Towards Accelerated Development In Africa 
otherwise known as the Berg report, which is considered obnoxious throughout 
Africa but which became the pivot for western and multilateral policy formulation 
towards Africa and was the immediate progenitor of SAPs (Structural Adjust-
ment Programs).
On the other hand, endogenous theories were developed by scholars 
from South Africa and Latin America especially and developed as reactions to 
earlier metropolitan scholarship. These riposte theories, especially the earliest 
ones being little more than angry retorts, were as deficient as the liberal models. 
In their unbridled radicalism, they laid the blame for Africa’s underdevelopment 
squarely at the steps of the international system and international capital ignoring 
the obvious detrimental contributions of local factors. This position, however, 
was progressively revised with the introduction of the argument of culpability of 
the domestic capital (comprador) class in its collaboration with the capitalists 
of Europe and America epitomized by Raul Prebisch’s Centre-Periphery analy-
sis. A further revision of the endogenous models emerged in the argument of 
the new political economists, who pointed out the grievous neglect by earlier 
works of class formation and the role of the social relations of production on 
the African crisis.
Balanced accounts that have not been skewed by ideological prejudice 
are beginning to emerge (e.g. Mkandawire/ Soludo [1999] and Arrighi [2002]). 
The essence of the foregoing is to presently demonstrate that there is a solid 
mechanistic connection between the different developmental paradigms that 
have been adopted and the ideological interpretation of the African crisis, i.e. 
developmental strategies proceeded directly from the diagnostic discourse of 
the crisis. Thus, the western liberal concepts which tend to view the roots of 
the developmental dilemma totally endemic to Africa have produced blueprints 
which emphasize domestic readjustments, reconstruction and re-strategizing. 
The Structural Adjustment Programs and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) are some examples. According to Arrighi, these ‘internalist’ models, 
typified by the Berg Report, argue that the African crisis ensued because African 
governments and elites:
undermined the process of development by destroying agricultural pro-
ducers’ incentives to increase output and exports. Overvalued national 
currencies, neglected peasant agriculture, heavily protected manufac-
turing industries and excessive state intervention. (Arrighi 2002: p2)
The solutions proffered included:
Substantial currency devaluations, the dismantling of industrial pro-
tection, price incentives for agricultural production and exports and 
the substitution of a private enterprise for a public one—not just in 
industry but also in the provision of social services. (Arrighi, ibid.)
On the other hand, African and Southern models claimed that Africa’s predica-
ment originated from the asymmetrical international capitalist regime, for instance 
the preamble to the LPA reads inter alia:
The effect of unfulfilled promises of global development strategies 
has been more sharply felt in Africa than in the other continents 
of the world. Indeed, instead of resulting in an improvement in the 
economic situation of the continent, successive strategies have 
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made it stagnate and become more susceptible than other regions 
to the economic and social crises experienced by the industrialized 
countries.(Emphasis added)
These assessments have inspired developmental paradigms that seek inter-
national economic realignment and put the onus for readjustments on western 
powers. They have at various times canvassed for a New International Economic 
Order (NIEO), for repudiation or reconstruction of the Breton Woods Institutions, 
renegotiation of UNCTAD and WTO trading arrangements, greater capital flows, 
ODAs and DFIs to Africa, debt cancellation/ condonation, abrogation of govern-
ment subsidies for western farmers, greater access for African manufactures in 
the markets of the North, better commodity pricing etc.
An Excursus of Africa’s Economic Policies and Stratagems
The earliest economic strategy progeny of neo-liberal intellectualism, which 
received the widest patronage from the new states, embraced at some point 
or the other by most developing countries, was the Import Substitution Indus-
trialisation (ISI) and Export Promotion or Export-led Growth.
ISI was aimed at fostering a national economy fairly independent from the rest of 
the world, it was, however, not a de-linking strategy only to reduce the import of 
finished goods, whilst concentrating on plants and equipment. The growth of the 
national economy was to be sustained by the expansion of the domestic market, 
because at the initial stages, industries would be adequately protected against 
external competition and production would initially be for the home market.
ISI was also supposed to engender the conservation of foreign exchange 
that would otherwise have been spent on banned imports, which are afterwards 
diverted to local investments. A component of the strategy was the imposition 
of a relatively high tariff wall or total restrictions on imported substitutes to do-
mestic manufacture.
Krueger explains that a variety of factors induced the preference for this 
strategy in developing countries. According to her, the infant industry argu-
ment- that an economic activity with perceived external economies on the long 
run could be incubated from competition in the formative years provided the 
developing world ‘a rationale for imposing high levels of protection for domestic 
manufacturing industries’ irrespective of whether the case was valid or simply 
motivated by a desire to industrialise and be self-sufficient. In her opinion, the 
other conditions that dictated the choice of ISI were the pessimism arising from 
the Great Depression due to the in-elasticity of the prices of commodity products 
and Arthur Lewis’ theory of surplus labour2. Lewis (1954) assumed that devel-
oping countries needed to raise their profits from national incomes in order to 
develop and that this was only possible through industrialisation. Industrialisation 
in these societies in turn could only survive through protection.
The Harrod-Domar model was also influential in the choice of these strate-
gies. Roy Forbes Harrod an Oxford economist and his Swedish counterpart, E.D. 
Domar advocated a growth theory linking income, savings and investment. The 
implication for African and developing countries in general was that their lack of 
growth was as a result of poor incomes, which resulted in poor savings and led 
to poor investment. Therefore, in order to grow these states needed to boost 
their incomes, the levels of their savings and consequently investments.
Export promotion strategy was contrived to create a specialised role in the 
global economy for the developing country. The developing economy was encour-
aged to concentrate attention and resources in the area of the world economy 
2 Krueger, A. Political Economy of Policy Reform in Developing Countries (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: 
MIT Press, 1993).
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where it had the greatest comparative advantage. If properly implemented the 
strategy was supposed to generate considerable inflow of foreign capital.
Both of these strategies failed to foster the economic growth envisaged by 
African governments for many reasons. Firstly, there was too much emphasis on 
capital-intensive activities and basic industries such as chemical and especially 
agro-allied industries were neglected, the result was that there was often no 
backward and forward economic linkage. The strategies were very dependent 
on importation of especially equipment and spare parts. In the case of Import 
substitution, success was limited by internal demand and the ‘narrow domestic 
base’ as ISI tended to focus on the urban centres, an additional detriment of 
this was the massive rural-urban drift to most African cities. Furthermore, there 
was a huge need of limited foreign exchange to drive the strategy.
In his assessment of ISI Turok makes the following observations:
There has been relatively little utilisation of local materials in the total 
production process and therefore, little savings in foreign exchange….
Perhaps the biggest failure of the policy has been the failure to develop 
linkages backwards and forwards between agriculture and the rest 
of the productive economy3.
In the case of Nigeria, ISI was preferred rather than other strategies such as 
Export Promotion and Basic Needs, but the implementation of the strategy 
achieved only ephemeral success and remarkable failure to transform the Nige-
rian economy into the fairly self sufficient model that was imagined, even in food 
production. The major features of Nigeria’s Import substitution, which is typical 
of most sub-Saharan African countries include the Nigerianisation of labour in 
the final stages of production, setting up local Assembly Plants to ostensibly 
make substantially finished products, packaging and licence manufacture4. Both 
ISI and Export Promotion were huge failures in Africa and probably everywhere 
else, except in South East Asia, where they were implemented with grievous 
syncretism to the classical theory and the principles of free international trade in 
general. For instance, the infant industry rationale was exploited to the point of 
making the Asian Tiger economies totally closed to the rest of the world and of 
promoting export-led growth. Local manufactures, which were inferior to global 
standard, were produced at exorbitant, non-competitive costs by inefficient la-
bour and technology and were hugely subsidised to below world market prices 
and exported as cheaper brands. This sort of sharp practice, anomalous as it 
was, was condoned and ignored by the North.
The successor policies to the failed ISI and Export Promotion strategies, in 
part dictated by a Marxist scholarship, were the Basic Needs and ‘redistribution 
with growth’ models. Both were short-lived and applied in subservience to the 
dominant neo-liberal paradigms.
The policy-based lending of the 1980s and early 1990s marked the next 
significant phase of policy prescriptions and adoption in Africa. There were 
two components; the IMF program was known as Stabilisation Policies and 
the World Bank’s as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). The difference 
between the programs is that while the former was aimed at reducing short-
term dis-equilibrium, especially budget deficits, balance of payments deficits 
and inflation, the latter was devised to restructure economies towards greater 
efficiency in the medium term5. These sets of policies represent the compre-
3 Turok, B. What Can Be Done? (London: Zed Books Ltd.,1987) p15.
4 See Graf, W. The Nigerian State: Political Economy, Class and Political System in the Post-Colonial Era. 
(Portsmouth: Heinemann Educational Books Inc., 1988).
5 Stewart, F., Lall, S. and Wangwe, S. Alternative Development Strategies in Sub-Saharan Africa (London: 
Macmillan, 1992) pp4-5.
SOUTH-SOUTH COLLABORATIVE PROGRAMME
hensive prescription of the North for development in the LDCs, a World Bank 
program is hardly implemented without an IMF program already in place.
The avowed objectives of World Bank Adjustment programs include:
Reduction in the size and better financial performance of the public i. 
sector.
Improving the efficiency of resource utilisation in the economy, ii. 
promotion of domestic savings in both public and private sectors.
Trade liberalisation and dismantling of artificial tariff walls, etc. This iii. 
must be pursued in tandem with export promotion, institutional 
support and incentives for export/ exporters.
Institutional reforms and elimination of price distortions in various iv. 
sectors of the economy6.
According to Gana, “the main features of the Structural Adjustment Program 
are well known”, they include:
Adoption of a realistic exchange rate policya. 
Rationalisation and restructuring of tariffsb. 
Strengthening of demand management policiesc. 
Adopting measures to stimulate domestic production and to d. 
broaden the supply base of the economy
Adoption of appropriate pricing policiese. 
Commercialisation and/or privatisation of government para-statef. 
De-regulation of the economy through the reduction/elimination of g. 
complex administrative controls, with greater reliance on market 
forces
Increased trade and payment liberalisationh. 7
According to Adedeji, ‘Because of their excruciating debt servicing obligations 
and the near-permanent need to have them rescheduled, they (African countries) 
… abandoned their own developmental strategy in favour of SAPs, seeing these 
programs as the price to be paid for a sympathetic hearing from their creditors’ 
(Adedeji ibid. p138).
stabilisation and SAPs have been variously denounced not only in Africa but 
the Third World as a whole. The greatest deficiency of these liberal prescriptions 
is their grievous neglect of the political context of Africa, where socio-economic 
problems especially thrive and have deep roots. A strictly economic recipe could 
only produce a cosmetic and very short-term relief, which disguises more funda-
mental structural problems; temporary reprieves purchase time and diverts atten-
tion whereas the structural dislocations and distortions get more complicated.
On Malawi notes, Harrigan stated that ‘a significant sustained macro-eco-
nomic improvement failed to materialise because the SAL (Structural Adjustment 
Loan) program refused to deal with fundamental structural requirements”8.
Generally, these programs are regarded as the kinds of programs destined 
to fail in a social context like Africa’s and the whole of the South or Third World 
for that matter. Firstly, the programs are not identified with the aspirations and 
goals of Africa, the emphasis was on short-term financial symmetry and concern 
was for the stability of the international system. Onimode submits that, ‘even if 
these programs succeeded in meeting their own performance targets, we would 
6 Stewart et al. op. cit. pp6-7, AAF-SAP p17.
7 Gana, A. Reflections on the Structural Adjustment Program in Olaniyan, R.O & Nwoke, C. (eds.) (1989).
8 Harrigan, J. Malawi in Moseley, P., Harrigan J. and Toye, J. Aid And Power, Volume 2 (London, New York: 
Routledge, 1991) pp201-264.
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still regard them as having failed, because they have not satisfied the objectives 
that African countries have set for themselves’9.
The most reiterated critique of SAP was its prescription by the ‘mad doctor’ 
as an elixir for all ailments and all peoples, the program did not take into account 
the specificities in the experiences of sometimes vastly different economic forma-
tions, whether it was Argentina or Burundi, India or tiny Togo, the prescription 
was the same.
Olukoshi observed the Bretton Woods duo continued to be impenitent even 
after it became obvious SAPs had failed woefully, ‘blaming implementational slip-
pages by African countries and less in questioning the validity of the assumptions 
that underpinned the adjustment package in the light of the observed reality’ 
(Olukoshi, 1999, p3).
The linear policy successor to the SAPs is the extant New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development Framework, introduced in 2002.
The avowed objective of the initiative is basically to tackle poverty all over the 
continent by promoting economic growth, NEPAD is also committed to pursuing 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The initiative reckons that by achieving 
an average growth rate of 5% continent-wide, poverty levels would be stabilized 
for up to 2015 and that, by achieving an average growth rate of 7% it would be 
halved by the same time. Analyses of the NEPAD strategy are already robust and 
still burgeoning, in less than four years of its launch, it must be the second most 
popular subject of African social science research in the past fifteen years or so 
after the SAPs. For our present purposes, a comprehensive assessment of NEPAD 
is not required, but suffices to say that:
Whilst the overall vision and goals of NEPAD are very commendable, 
copious aspects of the initiative and principally its philosophy and 
assumptions are severely flawed, … it needs to be stated that the 
blueprint is unlikely to take Africa through the woods to the path of 
sustainable development10.
Mbaye11 refers to NEPAD as ‘repackaged SAP’, Olukoshi remarks it bears uncan-
ny semblance to the ‘political conditionalities and governance reforms of Western 
donors’12 and Muammar Ghadaffi calls it ‘a racist tool of neo-colonialists’.
The first comprehensive and well articulated African blueprint for develop-
ment is known as the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA), it was adopted by the OAU 
Heads of States and Governments second extraordinary meeting at Lagos, 
Nigeria in April 1980. LPA continues to be the benchmark for indigenous de-
velopment policy formulation in Africa, the strategy is especially notable for its 
call for a sustainable, self-reliant and long-term development strategy. LPA lists 
Africa’s long-term development objectives as:
the alleviation of mass poverty and the improvement of people’s a. 
standard of living
self-sustained developmentb. 
national and regional self-reliancec. 
9 Onimode, B. (ed.) Alternative Development Strategies For Africa, Volume 1: Coalition for Change (London: 
Institute For African Alternatives, 1990) p48.
10 Aderemi, A. (2004) The Post-Bipolarity, Terrorism And Interpretations For Africa (paper presented at the AISA-
DPMF Conference on Africa & Global Governance in The Aftermath of 9/11, UN Conference Centre, Addis 
Ababa, December 6-7, 2004).
11 Mbaye, S. (2002) NEPAD: The Wrong Plan? In West Africa Issue 4333, 8th 14th July, pp29-31.
12 Olukoshi, A. (2002) Governing The African Development Process: The Challenge of the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) Unpublished paper delivered at Nigeria Institute for International Affairs, July.
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The salient features of LPA are as follows:
The Final Act of Lagos (FAL) was an adjunct to LPA. It strongly urged sub-
regional economic co-operation and integration. FAL incorporates clear sug-
gestions for regional integration and proposed the establishment of an African 
Community by the year 2000.
Since LPA there have been several colloquia on fine tuning or reviewing the 
implementation of LPA; the significant ones being APPER (1986), UNPAAERD 
(1986) and AAF-SAP (1989). AAF-SAP is central to any contemporary discussion of 
development strategies in Africa; it was put together under the auspices of ECA.
A critical study of AAF-SAP reveals an in-depth appreciation of the historical, 
socio-political and economic milieu within which the development dilemma is situ-
ated. The theme of ‘Adjustment with Transformation’ is an apt summation of the 
main complaint of the document about orthodox policies- African development 
and growth need not be sacrificed for short term fiscal and monetary stability.
The essential features of African political economy, detailed by the resolu-
tion, have been restated accurately elsewhere as ‘deep-seated disarticulation 
or distorted structural linkages, lopsided development, excessive external de-
pendence, undue reliance on exchange activities, lack of democracy and social 
tension’13. The framework concludes that, ‘one principal corollary of this structural 
reality of the African economy is that left to itself, it has an inherent tendency to 
generate crises from within and to assimilate others from abroad’14.
The fivefold strategy proposed by AAF-SAP is based on three macro-
entities, namely:
The operative forces, i.e. the overall African atmosphere: political, i. 
economic, scientific, technological factors; environmental, cultural 
and sociological aspects. These could be positive or negative, 
internal or external, permanent or temporary
Available resources including human and natural resources, ii. 
domestic savings and external financial resources and
The needs to be elaborated: these are the vital (basic) goods and iii. 
services and the ability to acquire them15.
The strategies of the framework are as follows:
committed pursuit of human centred and self-sustaining a. 
development
transformation of the African economy from an exchange to a b. 
production economy
democratisation of the development process through popular c. 
participation and accountability in public affairs
vigorous mobilisation of domestic resources and the revamping of d. 
institutions
serious and vigorous pursuit of regional economic integratione. 16.
A Synthesis of Paradigms- The Development Partnership Era
The introduction of NEPAD marks a watershed in the annals of development 
thinking and planning in Africa. Several other partnership models have been 
13 Onimode, B. A Future For Africa: Beyond the Politics of Adjustment (London: Earthscan, 1992) p78.
14 ECA op. cit. p28.
15 Ibid. pp26-27.
16 Onimode, B. (1992) p79.
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enunciated on the continent17, reflecting the ‘globalization’ regime of the world 
economy but it is the celebrated inauguration of NEPAD both domestically in 
Africa and in the North by the G8 that heralds the new era of development plan-
ning in Africa. The deal was for Africa to own responsibility both for its recalcitrant 
crisis and development dilemma and also to take pole position in its resolu-
tion by pledging to good governance which among others imply democratic 
political systems, accountability and disciplined administration of state power. 
They must adopt market economies and stem corrupt practices, promoting 
investment-friendly economic climates. On its part, Africa’s development part-
ners will provide both technical and financial assistance to ensure sustainable 
development and specifically achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs). The operational framework for implementing the partnerships, however, 
differ; Cotonou Agreement for instance adopts what is referred to as Economic 
Partnership Agreements.
It emerged in the throes of the massive socio-political and economic 
reconfiguration of the continent and marked the era of development partner-
ships in a formal and definitive sense. However, to make sense of this new 
confluence of strategies, the development must be located within the context 
of international political economy and its abruptly nuanced analysis in the post-
bipolarity balance of power.
Conclusions
The post-cold war period had a significant impact on Africa, which was posi-
tive and negative. The first one was what Huntington has referred to as the 
Third Wave, the massive re-democratization of the continent, the abrogation 
of prolonged military rule in Nigeria and the disassembly of apartheid in South 
Africa. This process also includes the dubious mutation of the uniformed military 
autocrats to civilian dictators in several African countries. This development led 
to the emergence of a more progressive and rather determined body of Afri-
can political leadership, including Presidents Obasanjo, Bouteflika, Mbeki and 
Wade in Nigeria, Algeria, South Africa and Senegal respectively. All of these 
emerged between 1998 and 1999; Kofi Anan also emerged in the same period 
as Secretary–General of the United Nations.
The major signposts of the new global dawn- the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the re-unification of the two Germany states, amazing techno-biological 
breakthroughs and the implosion of financial capital all paved the way for the 
emergence of the United States as a global colossus of almost unprecedented 
dominion, the resultant of this again was the emergence of capitalism and 
democracy as the universally dominant market and political ideologies in re-
spective terms.
Africa suffered from the demise of the USSR in two ways, namely:
The loss of bargaining leverage against the neo-liberal North and secondly, 
through the loss of mainly Official Development Assistance now deployed to the new 
CIS states of the former Eastern bloc or what is better known as aid fatigue.
This is the context for the emergence of development partnerships, the 
NEPAD initiative is denounced severally as a capitulation to Northern neo-liberalism 
but, being so strategically and financially weakened, Africa was in no position to 
dictate the terms of engaging with the North especially if the relationship was still 
one of donor-recipient.
Will development partnerships deliver for Africa whereas both endogenous 
and exogenous models have failed? There is little evidence to summon in sup-
17 Cotonou Agreement, the Tokyo International Conference on Africa’s Development (TICAD), US´ Africa Growth 
and Opportunity Act (AGOA) are subsisting models of development partnerships.
port of the general rhetoric of development partnerships; the brief history in fact 
indicates the contrary. Since 2002, it has become a ritual for African leaders, 
especially the foursome helmsmans of the NEPAD- Obasanjo, Bouteflika, Mbeki 
and Wade to attend every G8 summit, but in spite of lavish financial pledges, 
little redemption of these commitments have taken place. Secondly, partnership 
development agreements are little more than ploys to gain strategic advantages 
in Africa by the contending major economic powers, sometimes illegitimately. 
AGOA for instance was supposed to facilitate access for African manufacture, in 
particular textiles, into the American market through massive tariff concessions 
but this was already supposed to have been covered by the WTO phasing out 
of Multi-Fibre Agreements beginning from January 2005, a concession for the 
endorsement of Trade-Related Intellectual Properties (TRIPS) and Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs). EPAs on their part tie ODAs to the privileged ac-
cess for their exports to the markets of their lesser development partners con-
trary to the spirit of multilateral trade. On current trend, therefore, development 
partnerships may not meet the developmental aspirations of Africa.
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